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From Anti-trafficking to Social Discipline
Or, the Changing Role of “Women’s” NGOs in Taiwan

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Gail Hershatter has noted that prostitution has not always dominated public discourse or attention, yet at certain critical moments it may suddenly become the center of social concern as it is taken as “a metaphor, a medium of articulation” in which various emerging social forces and social anxieties play out their displaced existence (Hershatter 1997). As such, prostitution, as a recognizable “social problem,” may signify very different practices and populations and involve quite different ramifications as the social context changes. In the present paper, I would like to trace such a process of change through which the anti-trafficking discourse, understood in the Taiwanese context as the eradication of a specific form of underage prostitution since the 1980s, came to articulate a quite different set of anxieties and interests in Taiwan in its post-martial law era, as well as the process of how, as the anti-trafficking cause quickly lost its relevance in the fast changing social reality of Taiwan, it has now transformed itself into an intricate web of social discipline that also embodies “a vision of global governance.”
The mid-1980s were the last years of the notoriously repressive Taiwanese martial law, as well as the height of Taiwan’s struggling democratization process, and it was within this delicately volatile political milieu that “anti-trafficking” as a moral and humanitarian imperative, got “incidentally” hooked into a human rights imperative and came to provide a legitimate cause through which various social forces could rally for social demonstration. The central figure in the initial formation of the anti-trafficking cause was the politically militant Presbyterian Church of Taiwan. Presbyterian relief workers serving the aboriginal tribes had noted the string of girls, 13 to 16 years of age, sold into city brothels by a bankrupt aborigine economy amidst a booming Taiwanese economic miracle. As the advocacy of children’s rights became the central focus of international organizations in the mid-1980s, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan saw an opportunity to link up the local with the international. Underage aboriginal girl prostitutes were thus for the first time featured prominently in a report on tourism and prostitution at the Asian Church Women’s Convention held by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan in November of 1985.

Determined to stop the spread of this terrible sin among the disadvantaged ethnic groups, the Presbyterian Church set up the “Rainbow Project” the following year to advocate the rescue of aboriginal girls. Presbyterian relief workers would conduct regular missionary visits to families in the aboriginal area and take note of missing daughters so as to provide information to the police and urge the latter to put out searches for the girls. They were often frustrated because many policemen were rumored to have taken bribes from the traffickers and were never enthusiastic about looking for the girls, not to mention bringing the known traffickers to justice. More troubling was the worry that selling underage daughters to the brothels no longer seemed to be taken very seriously by aborigine families, and many of the girls even willingly returned to the trade after being rescued. For the Christian workers of the Rainbow Project, this was a sign of the total collapse of moral values in the villages. To save “the future mothers” of the aboriginal peoples, the Rainbow Project began appealing to nascent Taiwanese NGO groups to join in and pressure the government into eradicating what was then termed “the child prostitution problem.”

The proposal by the Presbyterian Rainbow Project met with warm support among NGO groups in the loose political opposition alliance. Labor issue-oriented progressives saw a clear case of exploitation and oppression of aboriginal girls being forced to work in the brothels. Human rights groups, which had been treading cautiously to defend the rights of political dissidents, saw the issue of child prostitution as a fully justified and potent case to accelerate the discourse of universal human rights. Nascent “women’s” groups had been groping for ways to arouse public concern for issues such as divorce, single mothers, or domestic violence, but to little avail. These issues were noticeable only as marginal social problems, waiting for a feminist discourse to help them evolve into a movement for social transformation. The issue of helpless minority girls being sold into prostitution and living in a state of enslavement, on the other hand, provided a clear-cut case of gender oppression that could trigger the deepest fear and disgust of women and perhaps mobilize more of them into political participation in the public sphere. Religious groups of other denominations or other faiths were also supportive of the cause to rescue poor, helpless girls and rid the society of this terrible disgrace. As protests and rallies were still deemed unlawful political gatherings under martial law, the groups gathered around the anti-trafficking cause to stage a small-scale march, titled “Face Up to Trafficking; Concern for the Child Prostitutes.” The march would highlight not only the plight of underage prostitutes, but also the evil doings of heartless traffickers, as well as the indifference of the police. The target of the march was the Gweilin Precinct of Taipei Metropolitan Police, which oversaw a specific red-light district notorious for harboring aboriginal girl prostitutes.

The march, organized and headed by the Presbyterian Rainbow Project, took place under martial law on January 11, 1987. Over 100 marchers gathered in front of the police station, demanding that the police make a genuine effort to rescue child prostitutes and put a stop to the operation of traffickers; slogans that condemned traffickers were chanted over and over again. Afterward, the marchers went into the red-light district and called out in the aborigine dialect to the girls in the brothels to leave the business and go home. Although the brothel doors remained shut during the march and it was not certain whether any of the girls heard the call, the march was significant because this was the first time a social cause, rather than a political cause, mobilized the Taiwanese people into the streets. And as police integrity and performance were profiled and questioned by this act, which did not make the government look too good at that delicate moment of political volatility (four months before the lifting of martial law), the authorities responded by announcing a special project effective March 1987 (known as the “Correcting the Customs Project”). The government promised that not only would more police force be devoted to obscenity sweeps directed at the sex trade, but those police stations that failed to wipe out child prostitution in their own districts would face austere punishment. The later execution of the policy proved to be far from satisfactory, but at least the issue of underage prostitution was formally admitted into public view.
At this initial stage of collaboration of the social movement groups, the general framework of reference for this united front was “rescue,” with a two-pronged goal to urge the nonchalant police to rescue the girls out of their immediate predicament and crack down upon the trafficking crime rings. In other words, the police were seen as at least partially responsible for leaving the girls trapped in the vicious circle of trafficking and prostitution. In the meantime, the united front hoped to raise funds that would help the girls leave the sex industry permanently, learn a useful trade or continue with their education, return to their homes in the aborigine tribes, and eventually become productive members of society.\(^\text{12}\)

It is significant that at this initial stage, the anti-trafficking cause limited its targets to the evil traffickers and the inept police, and maintained a rather pragmatic attitude toward the tenacious existence of the sex industry as a whole. The banner that led the march boldly read: “the human rights of prostitutes.”\(^\text{13}\) In their First Joint Statement of Cause, the anti-trafficking alliance, instead of calling for the total eradication of the sex industry, offered “supervision” and “unionization of sex workers” as part of the short-term plan to deal with prostitution, so that other prostitutes could at least enjoy some basic protection and autonomy before the eventual abolition of prostitution (Fang 2003). The Joint Statement of Cause thus cited its rationale for rescue efforts from the United Nations’ 1948 _Universal Declaration of Human Rights_ Article 4: “No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.” In other words, anti-trafficking at this stage in Taiwan was more _anti-slavery_ than anti-prostitution, with a strong human rights concern for the enslavement of a specific segment of prostitutes, the underage minority girls.

Such a focused effort would gradually broaden as Taiwan’s socio-political arena continued to change its scope. In order to meet Taiwan’s pressing need for economic liberalization in the new globalizing world market, which at the same time necessitated the liberalization of the political sphere, martial law was finally lifted in May of 1987. Post-martial-law atmosphere afforded a lot of opportunities for hitherto forbidden social mobilization, including labor activism that organized to resist Taiwan’s capitalistic exploitation, human rights activism that advocated the right to political dissidence, feminist activism that promoted the idea of gender equality, independence activism that worked toward reconsideration of Taiwan’s nation-state status, etc. As social forces bubbled for outlets, the persistent ineptitude and insincerity of the police (as well as local legislators) to stop the traffic of aboriginal girls was taken to be a symbol of the utterly inefficient and indifferent authoritarian state. The anti-trafficking cause thus believed that the whole legal system needed to be amended to ensure that traffickers and brothel owners would be dissuaded from such acts of victimization once and for all. In other words, tougher sentences would be instituted against trafficking, and reforms of the criminal code were to be included as one of the goals of the anti-trafficking rescue effort. In addition to stopping up the supply channel through these practical measures, the anti-traffickers believed that the demand side should also come under the auspice of law. Actions directed at legal reform and at eliminating the clients thus became the main focus of the second anti-trafficking march one year later.

As public demonstrations gained increasing legitimacy under the rubric of democratization after the lifting of martial law, the anti-trafficking cause also found more grounds to work from than simple religious humanitarianism. When the second rescue march was held on January 9, 1988, in the same red-light district in Taipei, the central organizers had become the Awakening Foundation, the feminist intellectual NGO that was developing discourses to turn the problem of child prostitution into an issue of profound _gender_ oppression. Collaborating with the Awakening Foundation on the organization work was the recently established Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation, an NGO devoted specifically to the cause of rescuing unfortunate women and girls who had fallen victim to domestic violence or human trafficking.\(^\text{14}\) Now discursively well-armed and politically righteous, on the morning of the day for the march, the core organizers first lobbied the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Judicial Yuan, demanding stiffer penalties for “the bad guys”—the traffickers and the brothel owners, as well as the Johns. In the afternoon, a total of more than 300 people representing various NGOs (including academic groups, “women’s” groups, aborigine groups, and Christian groups) joined a march titled “The Second March to Rescue Child Prostitutes.”

This time, as the marchers entered the red-light district again, they chanted slogans directed not only at the traffickers but also prominently at the clients who frequented the brothels. As the marchers increasingly chastised the Johns alongside the traffickers, what had begun as a humanitarian or human rights gesture a year ago was refiguring itself into a moral crusade against immoral men who brutalized young girls through the sex industry. Reflecting (and venting) the crowds’ increasing impatience with the indifference of an authoritarian government, the general mood of the march was now not so much “rescue” of the innocent but “punishment” of the guilty (_sinful_). Unfortunately, that impatience was also translated into a different position on sex work as a whole. The First Statement of Cause in the previous year had made a distinction between the short-term goal of rescuing the aboriginal girls and the long-term goal of the eventual abolition of prostitution. But the Second Statement of Cause in the following year dropped the conciliatory discourse that called for more supervision of the brothels and unionization of existing prostitutes, leaving the whole discourse leaning toward the goal of total abolition of sex work (Fang 2003, 15).
As competing loyalties or affiliations emerged and began organizing crowds for various urgent social issues after the lifting of martial law in 1987, the continued operation of the anti-trafficking cause fell into the hands of mainly conservative and religious NGO groups searching for more effective ways to curb the child prostitution problem as well as to reinstate moral values in the changing times of the early 1990s. They believed that a whole new special law would be needed to coordinate the various clauses of various codes and various agencies of the government into a concerted effort to not only punish those who were responsible for the trafficking of aboriginal girls into prostitution, but also establish a sort of preemptive/protective network to keep all girls from ever coming into contact with the perils of sex work.

The grand project of putting a new legislation into place called for a different kind of ballgame for NGOs, one that would involve heavy lobbying and advocacy strategies. One aggressive religious/children's welfare group, Garden of Hope (GOG), took the lead in 1992 to organize a task force of lawyers and social workers that would help draft the special law. The new cause was also helped along by pressure from international organizations that were actively setting up a minimum framework of rules to tackle regional problems that were deemed to have global significance. The International Campaign to End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (established in Thailand in 1990, renamed in 1997 as End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography & Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes and broadened to include the rest of the world, but still abbreviated as ECPAT) joined UNICEF in disclosing horrendous figures for children involved in sex tourism or prostitution in Asian countries. Proud of its own economic miracle but embarrassed to find itself listed among economically and politically “backward” countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Philippines for harboring child prostitution, the aspiring Taiwan government scrambled to improve its image and international reputation, thus creating a new window of opportunity for the legislative efforts launched by anti-child-prostitution groups.

As rescue efforts turned into legislative efforts, their scope of applicability also underwent significant transformations. The key justification of “rescue” efforts had depended upon the rescued girls testifying that they had been “forced” into prostitution. Yet, out of a complex of varied considerations, many rescued girls chose not to incriminate their own parents or the brothel owners. Without the element of coercion, the trafficking charges brought against traffickers or brothel owners often ended in acquittals and the girls were returned to their guardians or their parents, before moving back into the sex trade again. The erosion of the “forced prostitution” premise left many frustrated anti-traffickers determined to change the terms of indictment so as to get rid of this seeming “loophole.” Another factor that urged anti-traffickers to consider overstepping the question of consent was the realization, supported by quite a few contemporary studies, that an increasing number of the so-called underage prostitutes were no longer aboriginal girls sold into prostitution. Instead, many newly found underage prostitutes were simply ordinary girls who, helped along by the liberalizing attitudes toward sex in a sexually charged social context, chose to enter the trade for the lucrative profits it offered. Faced with this emerging moral crisis amidst the deep and rapid structural changes in the socioeconomic-political fabric of Taiwanese society in the early 1990s, worried anti-traffickers resolved that the work of aggressive and comprehensive “prevention” would make more sense than the work of reactive and isolated “rescue.” This significant change in approach and outlook would reveal itself later as a nationalist middleclass child-protection agenda taking steps to institute its own punitive-preventive measures of social control.

Several important transformations were thus effected in the process of legislation in the early 1990s. To begin with, the rescued girls' testimonies of their own consent to do sex work would no longer be taken into the equation. Instead, the act of sexual contact and the age of the girl involved would be sufficient criteria for an indictment, thus effectively erasing the subjectivity of the girls, and most significantly broadening the meaning of “trafficking.” One woman lawyer from the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation who worked closely with the drafting of the new law stated the basic spirit of the law bluntly: “Those under 16 are weak and shallow in their thoughts, and lack adequate power of judgment in relation to sexual acts.” Consequently, she believed that those who commit sexual contact or perform obscene acts with such minors should receive severe penalty “whether or not monetary exchange takes place” (Shen 2002, 26). Two significant expansions had been effected here: first, penalty would be applicable to any obscene contact, not just sexual intercourse; second, penalty would be applicable even when no monetary transaction took place. In other words, the target of the new law was no longer just trafficking or prostitution that involved minors, but any kind of sexual contact with (or even between) juveniles.

Moreover, penalties for the perpetrators of child-prostitution crimes were not only heavier according to the new law but also applicable to parties other than the traffickers and brothel owners. It would include: anybody who gave shelter to the girls (for any reason at all), the landlord who (whether knowingly or unwittingly) rented the property that was later used as a brothel, even the person who unknowing lent money to a girl who then used it to take a taxi to a love motel to conduct a sexual transaction, etc. To safeguard the girls from reentering the sex
trade after being returned to their parents, the new law would also allocate great sums of funding for halfway schools and other protection facilities that would keep the girls for a certain period of rehabilitation, monitor their progress, and eventually determine whether they were ready to be returned to normal life. Moreover, in order to prevent other "high-risk" girls from entering the trade, whether voluntarily or forced, the law decreed that a monitoring network be established whereby schools and police stations would be required to report and track down girls who dropped out of schools without a good reason. The girls would then be consigned to relief workers and social workers to be "counseled" back onto the right track of life.

In other words, the anti-trafficking and anti-slavery line, even the whole framework of "rescue," was being displaced by an anti-prostitution line that aimed to eliminate all that seemingly helped connect young girls to sex work, all that materially sustained the continued existence of such girls outside the supervision and jurisdiction of paternalistic families—while at the same time empowering the anti-prostitution NGOs in very substantial ways. Significantly, as anti-trafficking moved along this process of legislation, the class/ethnic outlook in the original rescue efforts was quietly eclipsed by a gender/age outlook that further affirmed the woman-child protection-prevention dyad which reached deep into all sectors of social life. An ever-broadening circle of control had conveniently displaced an originally humanitarian rescue effort.

Riding on an issue that had the potential to equal a moral as well as nationalistic imperative, the anti-child-prostitution cause "consciously" adopted "strategic marketing" to lobby leaders of the Taiwanese society, including policy makers, legislators, opinion leaders, religious leaders, artists, and celebrity performers (Chi and Zheng 2002, 43-45). Staff members were successful in recruiting people of influence to the politically righteous anti-child-prostitution cause, or at least getting them to sign the Anti-Child-Prostitution Covenant drafted by Nan-Chou Su, the editor of the Christian journal Wilderness. Besides approaching influential figures, the cause also campaigned in front of department stores and collected signatures from citizens in order to apply pressure to the notoriously opportunistic legislators. A total of 70,000 signatures were turned over to the Legislative Yuan, which not only highlighted the importance of the issue but also greatly enhanced GOH's public image and influence, from a Christian social service organization to a socially active NGO. More than US$300,000 in donations was collected through collaboration with the famous convenience store chain 7-Eleven. A total of more than 55 task force discussions, public hearings, press conferences, review sessions, and petitions were used to publicize the issue and lobby relevant legislators between May 1993 and July 1995 when the special law finally passed—which was record speed for any legislation in Taiwan's history. And all this time, an effective media campaign, including radio programs and slogans and rescue hotline numbers in TV non-profit ads, kept the issue and relevant activities alive in public view.

The eventual transformation of the anti-child-prostitution cause since 1987 was clearly dramatized in one grand event. Before the proposed new legislation moved into the political process in 1993, a third massive march through the brothel district was organized by the anti-child-prostitution cause to christen the effort. But in contrast to the first two marches which were distinctly NGO in nature, namely, small in size, consisting of marginalized NGO groups, and viewed by the government with suspicion; the third march—the so-called Anti-Child-Prostitution Jog—took place on November 14, 1993, and was attended by all the key government officials, legislators representing various political parties, educators, celebrities, and other social leaders, amounting to more than ten thousand people. Leading the jog were the Minister of Justice, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance, Director of Government Information Office, and other officials of the government, as a gesture of state support for such a noble cause. Instead of being the targets of criticism for corruption and indifference toward the child-prostitute issue, politicians and law enforcement officers were now running alongside anti-child-prostitution movement organizers and crowds, declaring war on the traffickers, brothel owners, and clients, and pledging to rid Taiwan of this unmentionable national shame.

While the public show of resolve was still riding on the strong sentiment against the trafficking of underage girls, the legislation was expanding far beyond the issue with successive expansions added on by opportunist politicians and concerned anti-child-prostitution NGOs as they responded to the evolving social realities of Taiwan. In the end, the version that was passed no longer contained much reference to human trafficking, but something much broader. In addition to broadening the category of punishable acts from sexual intercourse to all forms of "obscene acts," ranging from heavy petting, oral sex, and masturbation to posing for pornographic films, another new category of punishable crimes was also added to the law to truncate teenagers' increasing accessibility to information that was believed to lead to sex work. Advertising for sex work, advertising for pornographic materials, even provision or display of pornographic materials would be considered "solicitation," liable for sentencing of up to five years of imprisonment and $1 million in fines. The information control also brought with it a whole set of knowledge/power formations that not only demonized perpetrators, but also pedagogized children and juveniles. The law would provide detailed classification of the relevant crimes, and perpetrators would be categorized, labeled, and assigned differential degrees of punishment, thus creating a whole new conceptual framework for the so-
called child prostitution ring. The newly drafted law also imposed a clear demarcation on the age of the child or juvenile in question—differential punishments would be applied to the clients in direct proportion to the age and gender of the juvenile involved, with 14 (for girls) and 16 (for boys) as the benchmark ages. In short, a new parental and pastoral power concerning the sexuality of the young was gradually moving into place.

This parental and pastoral power was not only manifested in the punishment applied to traffickers and Johns, but more concretely embodied in the administrative power that would now be invested in the anti-prostitution NGOs. For, instead of turning a blind eye to the petition of NGOs, various state agencies—including the Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Health, Ministry of Communication and Transportation, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defense (!), and Ministry of Economic Affairs—would be bound by law to actively seek, inform, investigate, place in protective custody, and provide medical care and consultation for those girls suspected of doing sex work. Moreover, the performance of government agencies on such matters would be subjected to regular evaluations by a monitoring alliance formed by none other than the anti-child-prostitution NGOs and other sympathetic lawyers and scholars. Now legally endowed as “watchdog agencies,” these NGOs had the right to directly or indirectly report cases, interview suspected child prostitutes, bring lawsuits against perpetrators, set up placement institutions or halfway schools, and hold regular meetings with government agencies. The easy access to state information and power, plus preferential access to state-provided funding and resources, added onto their original image as non-profitable religious charity/social service organizations, would greatly improve the anti-prostitution NGOs’ sustained power to institute and monitor/supervise the implementation of the laws, not to mention increased staff and budgets through both government funding and public donations.

At the historical moment when the Law to Suppress Sexual Transaction Involving Children and Juveniles was passed in 1995, what had begun as an anti-trafficking effort initiated for aboriginal peoples eight years before had now been formally and legally transformed into a national establishment that held immense power and resources to regulate sexual associations, as well as sexual expressions, of those under 16. The formation and operation of such a “power of the civil society” would prove to be instrumental in urging the Taipei city government to ban legalized prostitution in 1997, which, to the government’s surprise, sparked off Taiwan’s first prostitutes’ rights movement, made up of 128 middle-aged, minimally literate, licensed prostitutes. Once again, marginal sex workers came into public view, but this time not as young helpless victims to be rescued by anti-trafficking “women’s” groups, but as mature sexual subjects resisting regulation by the now-powerful anti-prostitution “women’s” NGOs.26 The ironic turn of events reflected not only the emergence of a new subjectivity of sex workers in the Taiwanese context (from victims of trafficking to prostitutes demanding their work rights), but also the changed social status of mainstream “women’s” NGOs in the increasing bourgeoisization of Taiwanese society.27

III

As one key woman lawyer in the anti-prostitution camp put it: “The law will have to be continuously revised to keep up with the emerging forms of sex work for juveniles.”28 True enough—since 1995, the Law to Suppress Sexual Transaction Involving Children and Juveniles went through several major amendments. Each amendment was heralded as necessary in order to curb newly emerging social ills, and each further widened the web of social discipline. Most noteworthy of all were amendments introduced in 1999.

In response to media reports of Taiwanese men taking advantage of sexual tourism in other countries (whether it involves minors or not), amendments to Articles 9, 22, and 34 added penalties for such acts even if the country where the sexual transaction took place does not consider such acts as criminal. To make enforcement feasible, the amendment mandates tour guides or tourist agencies to become whistle-blowers or watchdogs, thus extending the long arm of Taiwanese law far beyond its borders. Amendments to Article 33, furthermore, made media agencies liable for the ads they carry in their publications or broadcasts, thus effectively forcing the media agencies to take on censorship functions that greatly impinge on the freedom of speech and expression. The media’s compliance would be further ensured by the anti-prostitution NGOs’ watchdog mechanism that would monitor, evaluate, and report on media performance regularly.

The most profound amendment had to do with Article 29, which has now become the most broadly and effectively enforced article. The original article had aimed to prevent those establishments in the sex industry (ranging from night clubs, escort services, porn production companies, underground pubs, and sexual karaoke, to telephone clubs) from putting up commercials to lure teens into the sex trade.29 So the original article read:

Those who use advertisement, publication, radio, television, or other media to publish or broadcast commercials in order to induce, broker, imply or by other means cause people to be involved in sexual transactions shall be punished with imprisonment of no more than five years and alterna-
nographic or other illegal material on the Web, and then assigned them to monitor communications and postings on the Internet. Statistics and figures of the “amazing inundation by pornographic material” were then made known not only to the government but also to the media to alarm the public of the pervasiveness of pornography and to urge more control and screening of the Internet. 36 But the target of such “purity campaigns” spans far beyond sexual transaction or pornographic materials. In its May 2002 campaign of “guarding angels on the Internet,” ECPAT encourages children to adopt the principle of three “No’s” while surfing the internet: “not to sell, buy, distribute, post, or forward pornography”; “to say no to prostitution”; and most interestingly, “to say no to one-night-stands.” The incongruence of the third term is symptomatic of ECPAT’s expanding goal: to end child prostitution now means to curb sexual explorations by the young. In that sense, measures taken by such NGOs are aiming much less at forced child prostitution than at containing the immense sexual impulses and curiosity demonstrated by today’s youths. 37

Since 1995, the once-anti-trafficking NGOs have evolved into mainly children’s welfare or child-protection agencies, with more than two dozen subsidiary care centers or halfway houses. Child protection has proven to be a much more potent and profitable concept than anti-trafficking. Garden of Hope, ECPAT Taiwan, Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation, and Catholic Good Shepherd Sisters have been aligned since the anti-trafficking days, presenting themselves not only as the moral high ground of Taiwan society but as the “heart” of the new government. Now no longer refusing the media’s reference to them as “women’s groups,” they have again linked up the concept of “women” with the middleclass idea of fiercely protective motherhood. In addition to gains in the judicial arena where new laws are being added to consolidate the control over sexual contacts through the Internet, these NGOs are also increasing their presence in the education arena. Proposed amendments in 2003 included clauses that required all schools to initiate preemptive reports on “high-risk” students who “looked like” they “might” get involved in casual sexual transactions; decisions may then be made to put them away in halfway houses for their “protection.” Government committees that oversee gender-related laws and gender/sex education programs continuously include these NGOs as regular members or advisors, 38 thus giving such groups even more access to not only the design of education policies but also the regulation of the education Internet, which effectively controls the activities of numerous Net users.

In retrospect, the late-1980s “discovery” of “aborigine child prostitution” and attendant local and international (religious) fervor of antitrafficking efforts in Taiwan has over the years become the terrain whereupon a nationalist middleclass consolidation of social and moral values
is taking place via the policing of sex as well as the eradication of all forms of sex work in the name of child protection, especially in the arenas of youth and Internet sexuality.

Aside from the justified deployment of disciplinary powers that these child-protection NGOs helped put into place in Taiwan, a major part of the welcome enjoyed by these NGOs in government matters must also be attributed to the opportunity of international participation that they have helped provide the Taiwan government. The child-protection NGOs’ affiliations with international anti-child-prostitution organizations often carry further links to other international non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations (such as Interpol, World Tourism Organization, and various United Nations agencies, especially UNICEF and ILO-IPEC), a connection network that the aspiring Taiwan government is eager to tap into in order to promote affirmation of its envisioned independent nation-state status. The NGOs themselves benefit from such a network too, for connections are set up for exchange of skills, information, and advocacy purposes between organizations in the developed countries and those in the developing countries, which quickly and dramatically enhance the effectiveness of local efforts as well as their power of influence. International events hosted or promoted or assisted by the international organizations give strength and credibility to local groups. Furthermore, the organizations share their work plans with one another, mutually strengthening each other’s projects. Linkages with all these organizations bring external pressures to bear on national governments to implement measures suggested by international organizations, thus effectively consolidating the “global governance” that the UN is aspiring for.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child, deemed as “a universally agreed set of non-negotiable standards and obligations,” is the most recent example of such consolidating efforts that work to identify national laws and practices that need to be brought into conformity with UN standards. The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan has passed joint amendments to the Children’s Welfare Act and Juveniles’ Welfare Act, effective June 1, 2003, in order to “bring the Acts in line with United Nation’s definition of children.” The amendments not only broadened the Acts’ applicability to those under the age of 18, thus greatly increasing the number of youngsters that come under the auspice of the law in the name of children’s welfare, but also more rigidly regulated the whole of social and virtual space in the name of children. The Internet and other media have to be rated and, if found broadcasting materials unsuitable for children, would be subjected to heavy fines and temporary suspension of licenses. Furthermore, parents and guardians are now held responsible for the activities of their children: if children under 18 are found to have come into contact with unsuitable materials, visited sex-

related recreational businesses, or lingered at gambling, pornography, or violence-related video arcades, then the parents or guardians will be charged and fined. Protection of children can even extend to before they were born: pregnant mothers are now prohibited by law from smoking, drinking, using drugs, chewing betel nuts, or conducting other activities deemed harmful for the fetus. It is speculated that as “gender mainstreaming” gains international momentum, more new rules and regulations concerning men’s and women’s daily lives are going to be prescribed in Taiwan to further consolidate the encroaching project of global governance.

IV

It is a historical irony that, as the original anti-trafficking fervor dissipated and transformed into a large-scale project of social discipline, the actual “trafficking” of humans in Taiwan at the present moment is being conducted on a much larger scale than ever imagined. Thousands of migrant laborers from, for example, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, and most recently Mongolia, are being legally brought in to satisfy the needs of both government construction projects and industries in the private sector, as well as the need for domestic help by middleclass families. Thousands of migrant marriages have also taken place as a result of dramatically changed global and local economic conditions since the early or mid-1990s (with foreign brides coming mostly from Vietnam and Indonesia, negotiated through professional matchmaking agencies at a cost, in addition to a huge number of Mainland China brides). Viewed in this context, when conservative “women’s” groups, in order to demand more stringent laws in the name of anti-trafficking, continue to invoke the history and memory of trafficking in terms of a traditional familial custom in times of economic poverty (the “selling” of daughters, daughters-in-law, etc.), it serves only to effectively displace/deny today’s massive legalized trafficking on the state level, as well as the discriminatory laws in relation to Mainland brides. On the other hand, the term “human trafficking” is always invoked in another specific context: the continuous flow of migrant women from Mainland China, or more recently from Russia, in search of better economic possibilities through sex work in this wave of rapid globalization. To describe such women in terms of trafficking—evoking lingering images of helpless aboriginal girls in the hands of heartless traffickers, brothel owners, and pimps—serves not only to distort/erase the subjectivity/agency of such migrating sex workers but also to demonize the political regimes from whence they come. In other words, the cause of “anti-trafficking” can still serve multiple political
functions—as a means to stabilize and consolidate state- and family-oriented projects (in state-sponsored construction work or the flow of brides from Third World regions), as well as a continued effort to defeat women's transgressive search for economic betterment outside the confines of marriage relationships.

In the past, astronomical figures of the rapid growth and spread of the sex industry are constantly cited by anti-prostitution groups to justify the legislation of more laws and ordinances that impinge on the life of every citizen in the name of child protection. Yet, what we have witnessed in Taiwan in the past 10 years is the incredible growth and power of an anti-sex industry that thrives upon the imagined evil existence of trafficking and the sex industry, as well as the conjoined aspirations for national-global governance. Such a web of normalizing knowledge/power conglomerate that continues to reduce the widely varied faces and practices of Asian sex work to nothing but the trafficking of women and children is bound to constitute more obstacles for the emerging subjectivity and agency of sex workers as well as the prostitutes' rights movements in Asia. And it is this national/global governance that has to be resisted. 46

NOTES

1. Tani E. Barlow has also discussed this concept in relation to the universalization of the gender analytic by Chinese women’s NGOs working in unison with the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. See Tani Barlow, “Asia, Gender and Scholarship Under Processes of Re-Regionalization,” Journal of Gender Studies, No. 5 (2002), 8.


3. “Human rights” as a concept had originally been used by the Nationalist government in Taiwan mainly to highlight the notorious human rights records of its rival, the Communist government of the People’s Republic of China. The concept was gradually appropriated by Taiwanese political dissidents to draw attention to Taiwan’s own record of political oppression during the People’s Republic of China. The concept was gradually appropriated by Taiwanese political dissidents to draw attention to Taiwan’s own record of political oppression during the People’s Republic of China.

4. The Presbyterian Church of Taiwan has been actively and openly promoting the nation-state status of Taiwan for the past 30 years and is quite closely linked to the present ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party. Its conception of human rights has always been framed in a nation-state status claim. The Church reiterated its political aim on the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration on Human Rights: “We reaffirm our intent, stated 25 years ago, to see Taiwan as a new and independent nation” (http://www.pct.org.tw/english/ arti02916.htm). Believing that there is no dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, and that the social, economic, and political are all within the field of interest of religion and religious bodies, the Church takes active measures to intervene in social issues, child prostitution being one of them. Admittedly, it was not easy to advocate issues related to sexuality among conservative churchwomen; issues such as AIDS advocacy (which was seen as only teaching

5. Foreign laborers how to use condoms in sexual intercourse) and sex education (which was read as encouraging the young to learn about sex) met with great difficulty (http://women.dpp.org.tw/publication/public2-12-17.htm). The issue of underage prostitution, in contrast, had a much easier time winning support among churchwomen, probably because of its Armageddon rescue/relief posture against demonized lustful/greedy men. Also, during the politically repressive era of the early 1980s, the Church saw firsthand the continued oppression of marginal ethnicities, exemplified in the existence of underage aboriginal prostitutes, and read it as echoing the oppression of the politically marginal, the Church itself included.


7. Significantly, the aborigine boys who were shipped off to sea in order to pay back family debts or to improve living conditions for the whole family rarely received much attention, even under the rubric of children’s rights. In contrast, aborigine girls who were sold off for the same purposes became central concerns of Presbyterian ministers and social workers.

8. The double bind of the highly esteemed Chinese family ideology of filial piety helped make it “natural” for the girls to sacrifice themselves for the family out of love, as well as to return to the trade after they had been rescued by well-wishing NGO groups. The church groups, however, put the blame only on the ruthless traffickers and heartless parents.

9. The picture of a poor, powerless girl crying helplessly in the hands of ruthless traffickers captured the imagined of the public and became a powerful symbol for prostitution even when it no longer involved such victimization.

10. One underlying basis of consensus has to do with the fact that many of these groups overlapped one another in membership and in their common commitment to opposition political rhetoric known as “democratization” in Taiwan. Today, Taiwan’s ethnic, age, gender, and (most significantly) religious connotations, mixed in with political concerns. All of these factors would play significant roles in the future transmutation of the anti-trafficking movement.

11. Feminist thought was first introduced into Taiwan with Hsiu-lien Lu’s pioneering book, New Feminism, in 1973, but it was more of a one-person intellectual crusade than a social movement. In fact, the book was widely read, not by women, but by dissident intellectuals at the time as a declaration of human rights in general—it is ironic that under martial law, political dissidence could find legitimacy only in discussions of gender inequality. The first overtly feminist journal, The Ascending, was not published until 1982; the emergence of the first feminist movement group had to wait until 1987 due to restrictions on the right to associate under martial law, which was finally lifted that year. Significantly, feminism as a concept might have been known to some progressive intellectuals at the time, but “feminists” were stigmatized as ugly, undesirable, angry spinster, butches, and lesbians. Due to the nature of their own membership—namely, heterosexual, marriage-bound women—most “women’s” groups that took part in the anti-trafficking effort chose to describe themselves as “children’s welfare groups”; they wouldn’t even want to bear the title of “women’s groups.”
Only one group adopted the term “feminist” to describe itself, but whether its individual members did so is another matter.

12. What had begun as a relief effort that depended mostly upon charitable donations would later evolve into a massive business that receives huge sums in subsidies from a Taiwanese government that, in the name of social welfare, increasingly franchises its functions to various NGOs and thus transforms parts of the civil society into power adjuncts of the government.

13. The choice of the wording here certainly did not derive from any pro-sex-work imperative: it would have emerged much later in 1997 with Taiwan’s first prostitutes’ rights movement. In reality, the declaration of “human rights” for prostitutes at this historical march in 1987, when martial law was still in place, only thinly veiled the demand for “human rights” (understood mostly in political terms) by the highly diversified march participants, who were distinctly opposed to the authoritarian regime as the root of all social evil.

14. The contingent coupling of a feminist group that believed in empowering women through political action and a women’s rescue group that aimed to restore peace and security to families was symptomatic of a time when a loosely united opposition front was needed in order to resist a quite authoritarian political regime.

15. Such “effective” means to stop the traffic of aborigine girls would also prove to be an effective means to greatly enhance the (financial and political) status of those groups working exclusively on the anti-trafficking cause, to the extent that quite a few rescue/relief groups that aimed at rescuing “unfortunate” girls (women) were established by various religious denominations in the few years before the 1990s. The Catholic Good Shepherd Sisters (est. 1987) were affiliated with the Catholic Church, while the Garden of Hope (est. 1988), the Rainbow Center (est. 1988), and End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism (ECPT) Taiwan (est. 1990) were all closely related to Protestant denominations. As those groups later took up the work of running halfway houses or halfway schools and providing spiritual education/counseling for the rescued girls, their voices and their religious-moral standards also became viable forces in the social framing of the problem of underage prostitution.

16. Garden of Hope even hired a new Director for Special Projects, Hui-Jung Chi, to coordinate such efforts. Chi had been a journalist for 7 years and knew how to work the media; she had also been trained in social marketing for nonprofit organizations by international groups and was eager to try out her skills in lobbying and media management. Incidentally, GOHI aimed to broaden its influence and power by upgrading the anti-trafficking cause to an anti-child-prostitution “social movement.” As Chi recollected recently, “Six months before I came to the Garden of Hope, the Board had passed a resolution [in 1994] to transform the Anti-Child-Prostitution Social Movement. In other words, the Garden of Hope was transforming from a charitable organization into a social movement organization. However, due to the sensitivity toward the word ‘social movement,’ we masked our transformation as ‘Anti-Child-Prostitution Special Project.’” (See: http://www.goj.org.tw/english/english.htm) The reference to “social movement” here had more of a religious connotation—a this-worldly vision of social reform—that is what is usually considered to be social activism. For over the years GOHI had also done the most actual damage in stigmatizing and shortcircuiting the efforts of sex-rights groups to advocate rights for marginalized sexualities. For example, in the name of “protection of children,” GOHI had repeatedly impeached feminist sex radicals for the latter’s alleged discourses on teenage sexuality, abortion, occasional sex work, or zoophilia.

17. UNICEF had reported numbers of children involved in sexual tourism in 1993: Thailand had more than 800,000; India had 500,000; Taiwan had 100,000; Philippines had 60,000. Between 1993 and 1994, Taiwanese researchers and official alike have repeatedly disputed the validity of such figures.

18. Their testimonies of having joined the trade “willingly” were consistently read as resulting from financial pressures from the trade against the safety of their families. No room was left for any consideration of the girls’ own agency.

19. Garden of Hope itself cited a study of teenage girls in April of 1993 that showed that over 30 percent of junior-high-school girls already had sexual experience, and more than 70 percent of the “rescued” teenage prostitutes “willingly” entered the trade. This new generation of girls, growing up in a social atmosphere quite different from that of the pre-martial-law days were much more daring and assertive when it came to their own sexuality. Consequently, such studies often evoked mass hysteria that resulted in more stringent laws regarding contact with teenagers.

20. The basic spirit here would be carried over to other amendments to the Criminal Code in 2000 that made sexual intercourse with teenagers under the age of 14 (girls) or 16 (boys) a sexual crime no matter what the circumstances are. Many teenage couples have suffered from this new legislation.

21. The Presbyterian Rainbow Project gradually withdrew from rescue work to turn to more education-oriented work, which was believed to truly enhance the economic status of the aborigine tribes so that trafficking could be stopped at its origin.

22. GOHI’s CEO Hui-Jung Chi remembers the event fondly in one interview: “In order for everyone to feel they were a part of the event, I designed it as a massive jogging event. You know, a very healthy activity for everyone. I had thought we could jog around this red-light district seven times, just like what the Israelites did to the city of Jericho, and it would disappear from the face of the earth. It would be a humorous ritual, a pledge of some sort” (http://www.cec.org.tw/sov/17.htm). It was not clear whether all those who joined the event were aware of this Christian undertone.


24. A major concern centers on the proliferation of sexual messages and the liberalization of sexual values and morals in Taiwan, prompted by a great variety of commodities. The Feminist Sex Emancipation Movement had intervened in 1994 by bringing forth a new liberating discourse for women’s and teen’s sexualities. But since then, the anti-child-prostitution NGOs have hounded feminist sex radicals for the alternative stand the latter take on issues such as sex work, surrogate motherhood, sex education, cybersex, and teenage sexuality.

25. The annual budget for Garden of Hope was US$ 2,000,000 in 2003, ten times what it was in 1987, and with 93 full-time staff members. ECPT Taiwan had a budget of US$ 300,000 in 2003, thought to be unbelievable by its executive officer in her annual report (http://www.ecpt.org.tw/html/view02_04.htm). The Catholic Good Shepherd Sisters’ annual budget is now US$ 600,000 and fast increasing.

26. I have put “women’s” in parentheses to highlight the fact that in a much earlier historical context, these NGOs actively avoided the label “women’s” and its accompanying stigma. But as the gender analytic came to be adopted as a state policy in the late 1990s, these anti-prostitution NGOs have increasingly assumed the position of “women’s” groups. And, as dissenting voices rose among sex-positive women in protestation against the reification of sex-related laws, the groups are now resorting to their old titles of child-protection groups to take advantage of the new and seemingly unchallengeable imperative.

27. The struggle of the prostitutes’ rights movement within the Taiwanese feminist movement over the issue of female sexuality, with sex-positive feminist activists being fired from the staff of the once-progressive Awakening Foundation. Feminist discourse was also stymied when faced with female sexual subjects significantly different in age and class, not to mention sexual sentiment and preference, from the underline aborigine girls trapped in forced prostitution which had come to frame most mainstream women’s groups’ representation of sex, not to mention sex work.

28. The statement is prominently featured on the back cover of the book that documents the whole legislation process of the Law to Suppress Sexual Transaction Involving
Children and Juveniles, signaling the plan of the anti-child-protection NGOs to further utilize this law for future purposes.

29. The law may have been designed to protect teenagers from being tempted into sex work, but "causing people to be involved in sexual transactions" never specified the age of the "people" referred to, nor whether it excluded the person putting up the ad, which effectively makes the law applicable to anybody who is sending out sexual invitations, not to mention messages for sexual transaction, on the Internet. As it stands now, Article 29 has proven highly ineffective in curbing such commercial sex advertisements against both professional and occasional sex workers.

30. Whether minors were actually involved in such transactions is of no consequence, for the mere "possibility" that they could stumble onto such postings on the Internet and become "negatively affected" is enough cause for prosecution.


32. "Enyko-sai" may have come to stand for any form of casual sex work in Taiwan, but Article 29 addresses not actual sexual transactions, but the communication that might lead up to such transactions. More than 2,000 cases have been convicted for their speech and self-expression on the Internet; whether any rendezvous or transaction had taken place was of no consequence to the law. In January 2003, a pregnant wife posted enyko-sai messages in her husband’s name to see if he would give in to the many calls of interest from women. The husband never made any move, but the wife was now prosecuted for posting enyko-sai messages.

33. The Center for the Study of Sexualities at National Central University had a website that collected relevant news, debates, panel discussions, and academic research on the issue of enyko-sai. When it posted satires of police entrapment of Net citizens for possible enyko-sai charges in 2002, the Center received formal warning from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Ministry of Education, for possible violations of Article 29: using electronic signals and the Internet to publish or broadcast messages that "cause people to be involved in sexual transactions." The warning had been prompted by none other than the child-protection NGO the Catholic Good Shepherd Sisters.

34. The Internet has also proven vital for marginal sexualities and communities, including gays, lesbians, transgenders, etc. See Chris Berry, Fran Martin, and Audrey Yue (eds.), *Mobile Cultures: New Media and Queer Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). Of course, under the auspice of the newly amended law, communications within such sexual communities are also susceptible.


36. In her study of prostitution in Victorian England, Judith R. Walkowitz has already noticed that empirical studies and investigations are often done on the so-called deviant behavior so as to pave the way for policy suggestions that aim to correct such behavior. See Judith Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 37.

37. ECPAT International’s mission statement describes the organization as “a network of organizations and individuals working together for the elimination of child prostitution, child pornography and trafficking of children for sexual purposes.” Yet ECPAT Taiwan’s monitoring activities often extend beyond the scope of children. Out of the 7 completed monitoring reports posted on their website, only 1 has direct bearing on children. In the end, the reports function only as justification for more obscenity sweeps on the Internet. The Ministry of Education is already checking Web 547’s reports to justify new restrictions imposed on postings on the education Internet.

38. For example, Garden of Hope’s CEO Hui-Jung Chi has been a member of the Ministry of Education’s Gender Education Committee since the latter’s founding in 1997.

Other such NGOs have also had their delegates on this committee that oversees gender- and sex-education-related matters nationwide.


40. Following upon the 2nd World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children held by ECPAT International in Yokohama in December of 2001, the First ECPAT-Taiwan Forum Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children was held on October 14-15, 2002, with three speakers from ECPAT International and SAGE (Stand Against Global Exploitation). Government officials are fully aware of the mounting pressure that should be made in such events, connected to Taiwan’s recent victories in other official channels. In fact, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Research and Design Committee Chairperson tagged along with ECPAT representatives to the World Congress in Yokohama, she was so touched by the opportunity to attend international conventions, as well as so impressed by ECPAT Taiwan’s international connections, that she wrote to praise the latter for conducting successful “citizen’s diplomacy” (http://www.ecpat.org.tw/html/view01_05.htm).


42. Incidentally, the expansion of teenager-related laws often entails expansions in halfway houses or shelter institutions, many of which are run by various welfare NGOs. In 1988 when the anti-trafficking legislation process began, one halfway institution (Taipei Municipal Kuang-Tze Care Home) built partly to shelter “unfortunate girls” petitioned to the government saying that over 700 such girls had been found by the police in the first 6 months of the year, but the institution could keep only seven girls on their roaster and was on the verge of being dissolved by the government. They were hoping amendments to the laws would help keep more girls at the institution. Not surprisingly, the Law to Suppress Sexual Transaction Involving Children and Juveniles effectively increased the number of high-risk or already fallen girls to be kept there for rehabilitation. Likewise, when the joint amendments to the Children’s Welfare Act and Juvenile’s Welfare Act were being proposed in 2002, the Taiwanese Association of Orphanages admitted that they had the capacity to house 3,500 kids but only 2,500 beds were filled at the time. They thus urged the age of protection be raised to 18 so that more children from “dysfunctional families” would fall under their auspice, not to mention an increase in funding that is required by the law they helped put into place (http://www.sapo.com/2002/11/19/327-1377473.htm).


44. The number of alien workers in Taiwan, totaling 150,000 in 1984, had just about doubled by early 2003. Gender distribution used to favor male alien workers but dovetailed toward the end of 2000 due to public fear that male alien workers may sexually assault local women. Last count in February of 2003 put male alien workers at 134,000 and female alien workers at 170,000 (http://www.cia.gov/ACP/ACPreat/mth/ta11040.xls).

45. By the end of 2002, the total number of foreign brides totaled 85,000 (http://www.ttdc.com.tw/2003/02/25/301-1417410.htm). The number of brides from Mainland China had, however, reached 140,000 (http://archive.udn.com/2003/2/22/NEWS/NATIONAL/NT05/1204192.shtml).

46. After repeated petitions and protests, more than 3,000 Mainland brides took to the streets in Taipei on September 20, 2003, to demand human rights and equal treatment as
the independence-minded government moved to change the waiting period of ID cards for Mainland brides from 8 years to 11 years.

47. For historical reasons, Mainland China and Russia (reminiscent of the Soviet Union) have long been considered Communist menaces to the world. Migrant sex workers from these countries who have come to Taiwan seeking better incomes are thus always characterized as, on the one hand, a demonstration of the thoroughly bankrupt rule of these regimes, but on the other hand, embodiments of conspiracies by these regimes to disrupt Taiwan’s moral values and economic stability.

48. Since 1999, the Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters (COSWAS), the only prostitutes’ rights group in Taiwan which evolved from the 1997 Taipei Alliance of Licensed Prostitutes (TAPL), has struggled to keep the right-to-sex-work initiative alive in public debates. COSWAS has organized four International Action Forums on Sex Worker’s Rights, three Sex Worker’s Cultural Festivals, and numerous dialogues between sex workers and urban residents so as to educate the public about the realities of sex work and to push for decriminalization. Their struggle and efforts have not only effectively challenged the anti-sex-work agenda but also spurred decriminalization initiatives elsewhere in Asia (http://www.taconet.com.tw/Home/).

REFERENCES


