臺北「面對亞洲」研討會演講1997.7.10
As we seek to problematize the western perspective
of "Asia," it might be useful to also
observe the appropriation of the idea of "the
west" as a hegemonic process inside Asia
itself.
The move to problematize Asia or other imaginary
cultural space often presents itself as a local-
or grass-root-oriented project in resistance
to a state- or capital-oriented hegemonic discourse.
While this self-characterization may mobilize
anti-imperialistic or anti-west implications
or sentiments that have worked to create many
progressive movements, such a dramatized positioning
may also be articulated with other social forces
that could work to retard the process of democratization.
After all, "the west" is by no means
a unified entity of imperialistic invasion.
Nor is Asia itself the powerless cultural space
on which the west is said to be attempting to
wield its formidable power of transformation.
In fact, "the west" may be in many
cases a concept that is evoked for various power
purposes and effects in the Asian context. In
the following presentation, I would like to
try to address such delicate maneuvers with
one specific example from Taiwan in relation
to the highly contested area of sexuality, which
also has implications for the Asian context
in general.
When the call for women's sexual-emancipation
was issued forth in 1994 from within the first
feminist-organized street protest against pervasive
sexual harassment cases in Taiwan, the incidentally
produced empowering slogan of "sexual orgasm,
not sexual harassment" aroused huge anxiety
and unease. In order to invoke the progressive
heritage of the west in the 1960s and 1970s
as well as the liberation heritage of China's
recent past, the new sex-emancipation movement
also produced discourses that deliberately adopted
the terms "sexual revolution" or "sexual
liberation." Unfortunately, how such a
controversial strategy may have articulated
local emergencies and contested local cultural
constraints did not get much attention. Instead,
the commanding presence of "the west"
in Asian imagination quickly took control over
the understanding of such a strategy.
For those who have been hostile to the women's
cause, the slogan is taken as a clear signal
that the feminist movement has finally gone
over the fence in its pursuit of individualism
and male-identification, stooping so low as
to cast off all moral restraints just to imitate
men in everything, including in the low-down
area of sexuality which even men should not
venture into, not to mention women. Viewed in
this light, women's interest in achieving sexual
pleasure, rather than maintaining sexual innocence
and abstinence, is understood as a bad influence
brought on by a feminist movement that has been
imported from none other than "the west."
Others who seem to be more "informed"
but still discontent with "the sexual turn"
in Taiwan's feminist movement found another
easy way to discredit such strategies, that
is, simply identify the familiar labels of sexual
revolution and sexual liberation as nothing
more than "copying the west." What
is worse, the slogans are seen as merely picking
up concepts that have now long been considered
outdated and bankrupt in the west. Some then
cite recent reports of the revival of family
ideology in the United States as evidence that
advocates of sexual emancipation in Taiwan are
grossly anachronistic. Americans are now vowing
to keep their virginity for the true love in
marriage, they say. Americans are tired of sleeping
around and are now returning to one-man-one-woman
long-term relationships, they say. Americans
are now reviving the age-old tradition of marriage
for keeps, they say. So why are we picking up
what they have now discarded? They ask.
Last but not least, many local feminists are
wary that the sexual turn may jeopardize the
hard-won legitimacy women's groups have barely
begun to enjoy. They believe sexuality is an
area fraught with controversies and dangers,
for women especially, and the so-called avant-garde
slogans should not be flaunted at the price
of the whole movement. Some feminists point
to the American radical feminists' warning of
"sleeping with the enemy" and the
cultural feminists' concern about women being
forced into unwanted sex under the sway of the
label of sexual emancipation. It is even brought
to everyone's attention that many sex-liberation
feminists in the west have now recanted their
former liberal positions. Accordingly, the movement
in Taiwan would do well to steer clear of the
mistakes made by the American feminist movement
in the 1960s and 1970s.
It is obvious that in all of these expressions
of hesitancy, the overarching presence of the
imaginary "west" and its possible
influence in the local context are evoked, albeit
with various contradictory connotations, to
characterize any new and undesirable development
in movement strategy. In addition, as an idea
distinctively incongruent with traditional Asian
virtues of chastity and virginity, sexuality,
even in its most rational discussions, is quickly
branded a dangerous western importation. The
persuasive force of such accusations is especially
powerful for the present Asian context, where
regional and ethnic pride has long suffered
under the expansion of western and imperialistic
powers, and has since been brewing in overcompensation
as Asia's booming economies gradually infuse
and strengthen Asian confidence. To be labeled
"western" could even be considered
a kind of betrayal to the statist cause of indigenous
self-determination now highly promoted by Asian
states. As soon as such easy labeling is applied,
nascent and unconventional strategies developed
by progressive social movements are denied any
chance for rational discussion or creative re-envisioning.
Such concerns and reservations do not limit
themselves to the question of female sexuality;
in fact, when the lesbian and gay movement began
to bring some legitimacy to a population long
stigmatized in the Asian context, opponents
also resort to similar arguments to point out
that such a movement is little more than a fad,
a game picked up by the westernized elite. In
other words, any new practice or discourse in
the sexual realm is easily labeled western and
then quickly and righteously discredited as
something foreign and thus inimical to local
culture. In defensive self-definition, many
came to see sexuality as the worst choice for
the dramatization of social and economic change
in Asia.
Still, ideological battles, social contradictions,
and other political struggles are frequently
displaced unto the surrogate realm of sexuality,
creating waves of discourses that further saturate
and complicate the structure of feelings surrounding
sexuality. It is little wonder that the historical
presence of sexuality in Asian cultures would
then be loaded with all the conflicting forces
of disgust and indignation (associated with
the booming industry of pornography and prostitution,
which often bring back memories of western military
presence in the recent past), fear and anxiety
(toward the active movement of women and teenagers
in a fast changing erotic culture fueled by
capitalistic commodification), and last but
not least, celebration and struggle (by sexual
minorities, or as some of us refer to them,
polysexuals such as rape victims, children born
out of wedlock, HIV-positive patients, sexually
active senior citizens, "the other women,"
homosexuals, exotic dancers and other sex workers,
etc., who are now for the first time enjoying
some form of recognition and some degree of
exoneration). All of these conflicting forces,
mixed in with the ambivalent feelings toward
the idea of "the west," settle into
sediments of diverse emotional traces and exhaustive
discursive exchanges, which constantly refract
Asian experiences of sexuality. It is within
such a volatile situation that the sexual emancipation
movement hopes to inject its highly political
intervention. If demands for racial justice
and gender justice have each in turn been labeled
as "western importation" yet gradually
gained recognition as legitimate social fields
of struggle in the Asian context, then erotic
justice may be the latest addition to the list.
Still, one view that is popular among many
so-called "state-feminists" holds
that sexuality is a field so thoroughly saturated
with male power, violent dangers, and none other
than western influence, that any effort by women
or the sexual minorities to change its power
deployments would only bring more harm to women
and the sexual minorities themselves. The advise
is then to stay out of the on-going struggles
in the sexual realm and leave matters to the
strong hands of state legislation and supervision,
a state that would be free of all "western"
(and other kinds of international) manipulation.
In other words, as Asia faces those so-called
senseless "bad" women, those immature
but sexually active teenagers, and those sex-crazy
homosexuals, who are said to be "succumbing
to" the sexual lures of capitalism; "the
west"--with its multifarious connotations
accumulated through Asia's complex experiences
in the past centuries--has become an easy label
that is now conveniently used to transform nascent
nationalistic pride into stubborn resistance
against profound social change and further democratization
of the social hierarchy. Such intricacies of
discursive articulation present serious challenges
that the new and progressive social movements
are still struggling to deal with.
