【這篇投書以卡維波為筆名，發表於《中國時報》時論廣場 ，2006年10月14日。英文版發表於Taipei Times，附於下方】
目前綠營對於反貪腐運動的看法是︰紅軍其實就是藍軍，藍軍就是不甘阿扁當選總統的外省族群，所以反貪腐的公民運動其實是族群動員。我認為紅色公民運動當然有族群因素的成份，但是「寄身」在公民身分中的族群認同卻不只是外省人，其中更值得重視的族群是日益龐雜的「假台灣人」，昧於這個趨勢將使得綠營的族群政策越來越疏離現實的變化。
先要釐清的是，即使當前的紅色公民運動有藍色族群寄身其中，這也無損於反貪運動對台灣清廉政治可能起的正面作用：公民運動所代表的價值也可能影響族群政治──讓藍色染紅。
如果紅色代表公民身分，那麼綠色也曾染紅過，因為綠軍也曾以族群認同寄身於台灣的民主運動中，以「台灣人出頭天」來達成民主。然而民主化完成後，綠營卻繼續以族群認同來推動台灣國族主義，這正是台灣形成藍綠對立的歷史脈絡。
由於推動國族主義的動力本身便依賴著族群對立的能量，所以台灣國族主義以「四大族群的共同體」或「新台灣人」來解決族群對立的企圖終歸失敗；於是還有綠營學者思考能否以公民民主來凝聚國族認同、推動國族主義。但是，公民身分是出於對公共事務的無私參與，台灣公民德性、公共文化、公民社會都仍在起步中，只建立在民主普世價值上的純粹公民缺乏認同的激情與能量，故而單靠民主公民無法推動國族主義。
同樣的，只靠反貪腐的公民價值與認同，我認為也撐不起目前紅軍長期抗爭所需的能量與熱情。紅軍的公民當然有族群認同的寄身，但是紅是否即為藍並不重要，因為藍本身已不再只是外省族群，近年北部都市也已經從傾綠轉變為傾藍，這兩個變化都標示了新族群內涵已然成形。
這幾年的藍綠對立，表面上是台灣國與中華民國的認同對立，但藍的成形和近期轉變，以及目前在論述上極力超越藍綠的紅軍，其實都是要抗拒綠的族群國族主義的排他性，而不是要推動中華民國的國族主義。換句話說，轉變中的藍軍或是紅軍所代表的族群，正是那些被綠營的族群國族主義所排斥的人口。
綠營人士可能會想︰台灣國族主義應該只會讓某些外省人有被排斥感，或最多讓某些原住民與客家人有福佬沙文主義的疑懼。從過去的「新台灣人」、「多元文化」到現在游錫堃的「華裔台灣人」之說，不是夠包容了嗎？
不過，這種思考正是綠營的盲點所在，因為基本上綠營仍是從血緣－語言角度把台灣分成閩客外省原住民四大族群，或再加上外籍新娘這類新移民。綠營沒有看見的是，除了有些族群因為血緣－語言而感到被排斥外，晚近台灣在全球化現代性的影響下還產生了很多新的認同、慾望與選擇，而這些都超越了血緣－語言的限制，也往往超越了民族國家的疆界；可是台灣國族主義卻常成為這些新機會、新選擇、新族群的絆腳石，或者讓這些新族群感到不夠被包容。最明顯的就是台灣國族主義以台／華（中國）對立為根本，其政策與營造的氛圍都讓那些目前（可能是暫時）以中國為新出路選擇或可能機會的族群感到被阻撓或被排斥。
但是台灣的新認同與新族群遠多於綠營所關心的台華關係。例如有些人身在台灣，但是總是透過電腦等各種網絡活在韓國的世界裡，這些應被稱為「台裔韓國人」或各類活在台灣的跨國空間中的「台裔XX人」（如熱衷與西方男性在虛擬或現實中建立關係的台灣男女）早就存在於我們四周，只是平常假裝成和大家一樣是普通的愛台灣之國民而已。像這樣的「假台灣人」其實系譜繁多交雜，不勝枚舉。
還有許多「假台灣人」雖然接受台灣國族身分，但已經不把血緣－語言族群或國族當作主要認同，她們主要認同的可能是某種性／別慾望，可能是某種次文化，可能是某種理想、宗教、生活方式、行業、嗜好等等。綠營出於焦慮感而強勢推銷並非這些人主要認同的台灣國族主義，也會讓這些族群產生反感或不安。
國族主義的排他性在政治地理與性別地理上都有類似的效應。目前台灣整體都處於全球化的影響下（不論稱為晚期現代性或後現代性），北部城市與全球化網絡或許有較多的聯繫，或具有更好的條件來使用全球化帶來的機會資源，自不情願侷限於血緣－語言的束縛。解嚴後，男女平等的機會增加，女性是個積極向上爬升、自我改善甚力的族群，在抓住全球生涯變化的各類選擇與機會上也最為敏感，因此最可能會抗拒族群國族主義不可避免的排他性，越來越多女性加入紅軍不足為奇。
年輕人曾因民進黨接近新世代而支持綠營，但是晚近在全球化浪潮下成長的新年輕人口已然成為各種新認同與假台灣人的潛在大軍。一旦這代年輕人就業並因現實利害而要求國家不要阻礙其個人更多全球性機會與選擇時，綠營以族群國族主義為基本的政治路線必將陷入更大的危機。
不過排他的族群政治與國族主義仍然有其活躍的條件，因為全球化也帶來在地文化的認同追尋、以及民族國家對全球化的防衛。雖然對於在地文化的認同需要一部份會轉化為各種消費形式，但是可以結合未蒙全球化其利的區域之族群政治，而在政治市場上佔有一席之地。此外，由於當民族國家在對全球化採取防衛姿態與策略時，國族主義是重要的利用工具，故而即使在藍營執政時也不會消失（藍營雖不會採取族群國族主義形式，但間接地延續族群國族主義所需要的國族主義資源）。但是若綠營本身無重大變化，則恐將繼續採取族群國族主義的形式；這意味著藍綠對立仍將在未來延續；在兩岸三通之後，族群國族主義的版圖或許會縮小，但是對立可能會加劇。當然，台灣在全球化下進一步的發展形態會是決定性因素。
Pan-green nationalism is restrictive
By Ning Yin-bin，Taipei times，Oct 18, 2006, Page 8
The pan-green camp’s current view of the anti-corruption campaign against President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) is that the “reds” are synonymous with the pan-blue camp, which, in turn, is made up of Mainlanders who are unhappy with the fact that Chen is president. Therefore, the so-called anti-corruption campaign is in fact based on ethnic mobilization.
I believe that the ethnic issue is part of the campaign, but Mainlanders are not the only ethnic group driving the protests. A group deserving of greater attention is the growing and increasingly complex amalgam of “fake Taiwanese.” Ignoring this trend will cause the pan-green camp’s ethnic policy to gradually depart from reality.
We need to clarify that even if the anti-Chen campaign also includes pan-blue supporters, this does not diminish the possibility that the campaign might have a positive effect on political integrity in Taiwan. The values represented by the campaign may also affect ethnic politics, adding more “red” into the “blue.”
If the color red represents nationality, then the pan-green camp had also been red in the past, since it made its ethnic identification part of Taiwan’s democracy movement, accomplishing its democratic goals under the slogan “the Taiwanese stand up.” After the process of democratization was near completion, however, the pan-green camp continued to rely on ethnic identification, leading to the confrontation between the pan-blue and pan-green camps.
Because the pan-green’s nationalism fed on the energy arising from ethnic conflict, the attempt to resolve this conflict by establishing a pan-Taiwanese nationalism based on “a shared community of the main four ethnic groups” or the “new Taiwanese” concept failed.
Some pro-green academics then considered the possibility that civic democracy — the practice of democracy at the municipal level where an active and engaged citizenry is the primary source of political power — could be used to consolidate national identification.
However, a civic identity grows out of unselfish participation in public affairs, whereas Taiwan is still in the initial stages of developing a public culture and a civil society. A civic identity based solely on the universal value of democracy lacks the passion and energy that stems from national identification. Relying on democracy is not enough to build nationalism.
Similarly, I believe that civic values and identification solely based on the call for anti-corruption is insufficient to provide the passion and energy the red camp needs to sustain long-term opposition.
The red camp also has its own brand of ethnic identification, but the question of whether the red and pan-blue camps are the same does not matter anymore, since the pan-blue camp no longer consists of only Mainlanders, and since cities and counties in northern Taiwan have started leaning toward the pan-blues. These changes show that ethnicity has taken on a new meaning.
On the surface, the blue-green confrontation over the past few years has been a conflict between identification with a Republic of Taiwan and the Republic of China. But the formation of the pan-blue camp and its recent transformation, as well as the reds’ intense efforts to transcend the green and blue camps, are an attempt to resist the exclusiveness of pan-green ethnic nationalism rather than a push for ROC nationalism.
In other words, the changing pan-blue camp and the red camp are made up of groups excluded by the pan-green camp’s ethnic nationalism.
Pan-green supporters may think that Taiwanese nationalism has only made some Mainlanders feel excluded. Aren’t “new Taiwanese,” “cultural diversity” and the “Chinese Taiwanese” concept proposed by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairman Yu Shyi-kun last month sufficiently tolerant discourses?
This kind of thinking, however, is indicative of the pan-green camp’s blind spot. The pan-greens still basically divide Taiwan on language and blood lines into four groups — Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders and Aboriginals. Some may add in foreign brides and other new immigrants.
What the green camp fails to see is that in addition to some people feeling excluded on the basis of language and blood line, globalization has created many more identities, aspirations and choices which supersede ethnic and language divisions and often also override state borders.
Taiwanese ethnic nationalism often becomes a stumbling block to those pursuing these new oppor-tunities and choices or cause these new ethnic groups to feel a lack of tolerance toward the mainstream identity. The most obvious problem of Taiwanese nationalism is seen in the Taiwan/China polarization, which creates an atmosphere where the groups that see the future in closer ties with China feel thwarted or excluded.
But there are many more new identities and ethnic groups in Tai-wan than the Taiwanese/Chinese labels that most concern the pan-greens. For example, some people who are physically in Taiwan may have a Korean identity thanks to the Internet — they could be called “Koreans of Taiwanese descent,” just as other people who live in the international sphere could be labeled based on their location. These people exist everywhere, although they normally act as if they are Taiwanese citizens like everybody else.
These “fake Taiwanese” accept a Taiwanese nationality but no longer focus their identification on blood and language line or nationality. They may primarily identify with their sexual orientation, a subculture, certain ideals, a religion, a lifestyle, an industry, or a hobby and so on. The Taiwanese nationalism promoted by the pan-green camp is not a nationalism that these people identify with, and it will cause these groups to feel insecure and angry.
Globalization has brought more resources and opportunities to the north of the country, perhaps because people in this area are more integrated into global commercial networks and are unwilling to be defined along blood and language lines.
The exclusionary nature of Taiwanese ethnic nationalism affects gender as well as politics. After the end of martial law, gender equality became more possible, and women as a group climbed the social ladder and improved themselves. As a result, they may be the most likely to protest the inevitable exclusion caused by ethnic nationalism. That increasing numbers of women are joining the red-clad protesters should not be surprising.
In the past, young people embraced the DPP because the party was closer to the younger generation, but today’s young have grown up in a globalizing world and threaten to become an army of potential “fake Taiwanese” and subscribers to new identities. When they become employed and push for a state that doesn’t limit their individual global opportunities and choices, the DPP’s policies based on ethnic nationalism will face even greater dangers.
However, since globalization also has brought with it a quest to recognize local cultures, conditions for exclusive ethnic policies and nationalism still exist. Although part of the need for recognition of local culture will be commercialized, this need can be integrated with ethnic politics in areas where globalization has not made itself fully felt.
In addition, because nationalism remains an important tool when nation states adopt defensive attitudes and strategies toward globalization, it will remain even under a pan-blue govern-ment, although not in the form of ethnic Taiwanese nationalism.
Without any major changes with-in the pan-green camp, however, it will probably continue to pursue ethnic nationalism, which implies that the blue-green confrontation will continue. But will it intensify? Will the market for ethnic nationalism shrink? This will depend on Taiwan’s future development in a globalizing world.
Ning Yin-bin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of Philosophy at National Central University. Translated by Eddy Chang, Jason Cox and Perry Svensson